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INTRODUCTION 
In October of 2019, the Supreme Court heard the arguments of two 
cases presenting the same inquiry: whether Title VII’s prohibition on 
sex discrimination encompasses discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.1 Currently, twenty-one states as well as the District of 
Columbia expressly prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation by statute or regulation.2 Other states offer protection in 
the form of agency interpretation or court ruling.3 However, for the 
remaining states with no established protections, Title VII stands as the 
only potential safeguard against sexual orientation discrimination.4 
The following Commentary considers the case of Gerald Bostock, 
a gay man from the state of Georgia who was fired from his job in 2013.5 
The Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII does not prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, but Bostock appealed the 
case and was granted certiorari. The Supreme Court consolidated this 
case with Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda and allotted a single hour for 
oral argument that took place on October 8, 2019.6 The Supreme Court 
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 1. Loren AliKhan, Symposium: A Trio of Cases, a Lot at Stake, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 9, 
2019, 3:26 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/09/symposium-a-trio-of-cases-a-lot-at-stake/. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Bostock v. Clayton County, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1618 (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2019). 
 6. Gerald Lynn Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, FREEDOM FOR ALL AMERICANS, 
https://www.freedomforallamericans.org/gerald-lynn-bostock-v-clayton-county-
georgia/#targetText=Gerald%20Lynn%20Bostock%20v.%20Clayton,argues%20applies%20to
%20sexual%20orientation (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda is a Second 
Circuit case presenting the same issue. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 
2018). 
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is expected to come to a decision in the first half of 2020.7 The Court 
will decide whether to expand the definition of the term “sex” in Title 
VII to include sexual orientation, which is a desirable policy on its face.8 
Discrimination in the workplace—based on anything other than work 
performance—is not only archaic, but abhorrent. A redefinition of the 
term “sex” would also help resolve the circuit court split on the issue. 
However, these cases might instead push the Supreme Court to make 
a more consequential decision, one stretching the bounds of 
Constitutional separation of powers.9 
I. FACTS 
In 2003, Gerald Lynn Bostock began working for Clayton County, 
Georgia, as the Child Welfare Services Coordinator assigned to the 
Juvenile Court.10 Bostock was given primary responsibility for the 
Court Appointed Special Advocates program (“CASA”) in which he 
advocated for the interests of at-risk youth in the juvenile court 
system.11 During his tenure, Bostock received favorable performance 
reviews and Clayton County’s CASA program received the  2007 
Program of Excellence Award from Georgia CASA.12 Furthermore, 
Bostock was asked to serve on the National CASA Standards and 
Policy Committee in both 2011 and 2012.13 
Bostock identifies as gay and, in January 2013, he began 
participating in a gay recreational softball league.14 Bostock claims that 
during the following months, individuals with significant influence on 
Clayton County’s decision making openly criticized Bostock’s 
participation in the league as well as his sexual orientation.15 In April 
2013, Clayton County initiated an audit of its CASA program funds, 
which Bostock managed.16 Bostock claims the audit was unwarranted 
and was prompted due to his sexual orientation and failure to conform 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Andrée Blumstein, Symposium: How the Title VII Trilogy May Test the Court, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 5, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/09/symposium-how-
the-title-vii-trilogy-may-test-the-court/. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (June 26, 
2019) (No. 17-1618) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Writ of Cert.]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 4–5.  
 13. Id. at 5. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 5. 
 16. Id. 
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to gender stereotypes.17 Bostock also asserts that members of the 
Friends of Clayton County CASA Advisory Board disparaged his 
sexual orientation and that his participation in the softball league was 
criticized during one of their meetings.18 
On June 3, 2013, Bostock was fired from his position as Child 
Welfare Services Coordinator.19 Clayton County stated that Bostock 
mismanaged CASA funds and thus terminated him for “conduct 
unbecoming of a county employee.”20 Bostock now claims that his 
termination was a result of discrimination based on “sex” in violation 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 Clayton County contends 
that, even if Bostock’s claim was true, Bostock has no actionable Title 
VII claim because the statute does not extend to discrimination based 
on sexual orientation.22 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Bostock filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. In return, the EEOC issued a “right to sue” letter, stating 
he had a potentially legitimate discrimination claim.23 He then filed a 
pro se action against Clayton County in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia.24 Clayton County moved 
to dismiss the complaint on September 26, 2016.25 It argued Title VII 
does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.26 The 
County also argued the complaint did not adequately allege a claim of 
gender stereotyping.27 
On November 3, 2016, the magistrate judge recommended 
dismissal on Bostock’s claim.28 The judge held that Title VII does not 
cover claims of sexual orientation discrimination, applying Fifth Circuit 
precedent set in Blum v. Gulf.29 The judge noted the EEOC now 
 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 6. 
 19. Id. at 5. 
 20. Id. at 5–6. 
 21. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (Sept. 10, 2019) 
(No. 17-1618) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner]. 
 22. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 6–9,  
 23. Brief for Respondent at 3, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (Aug. 16, 2019) 
(No. 17-1618) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 7–8.  
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. Id; Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Geographically, 
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interprets Title VII to encompass sexual orientation discrimination, but 
reasoned a district court should not defer to the EEOC’s 
determinations over the precedent set by Blum.30 The judge also 
recommended dismissal of Bostock’s gender stereotyping claim.31 
Bostock objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, but 
consideration of the case was deferred until the Eleventh Circuit issued 
a decision in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital.32 The Eleventh 
Circuit issued its decision on Evans on March 10, 2017,33 holding that 
Blum remained binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit34 and that 
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.35 In light of this, the district court dismissed Bostock’s 
gender stereotyping claim and accordingly entered a judgment in favor 
of Clayton County.36 Bostock appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.37 
Bostock also filed a preliminary petition for rehearing en banc.38 The 
Eleventh Circuit denied Bostock’s preliminary petition and affirmed 
the district court’s decision.39 
In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit looked to both Blum and Evans 
as precedent, holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.40 The court rejected Bostock’s argument 
that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sundowner and Price Waterhouse 
support Title VII claims for sexual orientation discrimination.41 The 
Eleventh Circuit determined that its own precedent was too compelling 
to agree with Bostock’s arguments, stating: “Our holding in Evans 
forecloses Bostock’s claim. And under our prior panel precedent rule, 
 
the Eleventh Circuit was originally part of the Fifth Circuit, but split off to form the Eleventh 
Circuit effective October 1, 1981. For this reason, Fifth Circuit decisions from before this split are 
considered binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. 
 30. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 6; Blum, 597 F.2d 936; Baldwin v. Foxx, 
EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July 15, 2015).  
 31. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 7.  
 32. Id.; In Evans, the Eleventh Circuit considered the same issue, whether sexual orientation 
discrimination was actionable under Title VII. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 
2017).  
 33. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1248.  
 34. Id. at 1255.  
 35. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 5.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 5.  
 39. Id. at 6; Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 723 F. App’x 964, 964–65 (11th Cir. 
2018) (denying preliminary petition for rehearing en banc).   
 40. Id. 
 41. Id; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989).  
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we cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding, regardless of whether we 
think it was wrong, unless an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh 
Circuit en banc decision is issued.”42 
However, there was not unanimity among the Eleventh Circuit 
panel when they issued their decision.43 Judge Rosenbaum filed a 
contemptuous dissent, arguing for the case to be reheard:44 
The issue this case raises—whether Title VII protects gay and 
lesbian individuals from discrimination because their sexual 
preferences do not conform to their employers’ views of 
whom individuals of their respective genders should love—is 
indisputably en-banc-worthy. . . . I cannot explain why a 
majority of our Court is content to rely on the precedential 
equivalent of an Edsel with a missing engine, when it comes 
to an issue that affects so many people.45 
She scolded the court for clinging to aged precedent and argued that 
the Eleventh Circuit was leaving a large portion of the population 
vulnerable to sexual orientation discrimination. The court denied Judge 
Rosenbaum’s plea to rehear the case.46 
Bostock filed his petition for writ of certiorari on June 1, 2018.47 On 
April 22, 2019, the Petition was granted.48 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Circuit Court Split 
Prior to 2017, at least nine federal circuit courts had ruled that 
sexual orientation is not covered under the term “sex” in Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.49 However, in the last few years, courts have 
begun to split on the issue.50 In 2015, the EEOC started the shift in 
interpretation with the Baldwin v. Foxx ruling, stating that Title VII 
 
 42. Bostock, 723 Fed. App’x. at 965. 
 43. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 894 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 1336. 
 45. Id. at 1336–37. 
 46. Id. at 1335. 
 47. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 5.  
 48. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1618). 
 49. Robert Iafolla, Supreme Court Can Settle Split on LGBT Bias in the Workplace, 
BLOOMBERGLAW (Apr. 22, 2019, 9:54 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
report/supreme-court-can-settle-split-on-lgbt-bias-in-the-workplace. 
 50.  Id. 
BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2020  10:09 AM 
64 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 15 
does apply to sexual orientation.51 Although the decision was not 
binding precedent, it sparked a new wave of reinterpretation of the 
term “sex” in Title VII.52 
The first federal appeals court to reinterpret the meaning of “sex” 
in Title VII was the Seventh Circuit in 2017.53 In Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Community College of Indiana, the Seventh Circuit held in an 8-3 
decision that workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation 
violated Title VII.54 Hively was a landmark case, overturning Seventh 
Circuit precedent.55 The Second Circuit quickly followed suit in 2018 
with Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.56 
In 2017, the Eleventh Circuit came to the opposite conclusion, 
holding that sexual orientation discrimination was not covered under 
Title VII.57 The court reasoned that “[b]ecause Congress has not made 
sexual orientation a protected class, the appropriate venue for pressing 
the argument raised by the Commission and the dissent is before 
Congress, not this Court. And for decades, members of Congress have 
introduced bills for that purpose.”58 The court refused to infringe on 
what it believed to be Congress’s legislative power in deference to 
precedent set forth in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.59 
B. The Supreme Court and Gender-Stereotyping Distinction 
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins that, when an employer relies on sex-based considerations or 
takes gender into account when taking an employment-related action, 
it violates Title VII.60 In Price Waterhouse, plaintiff Ann Hopkins sued 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Erin Connell & Kathryn Mantoan, EEOC Rules that Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
is Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, ORRICK (July 28, 2015), https://blogs.orrick.com/ 
employment/tag/baldwin-v-foxx/. 
 53. Iafolla, supra note 49; Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 54. Hively, 853 F.3d at 339. 
 55. Iafolla, supra note 49. 
 56. Id; Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 57. Litigation Tracker: Eleventh Circuit, FREEDOM FOR ALL AMERICANS, 
https://www.freedomforallamericans.org/category/circuit-courts/eleventh-circuit/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2019); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l. Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 58. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261. 
 59. Id.; Litigation Tracker: Eleventh Circuit, supra note 57. Although Blum is a 1979 Fifth 
Circuit holding, the Eleventh Circuit is bound by it because it was part of the Fifth Circuit until 
1981. 
 60. Jenny Yang, Does the law protect the LGBTQ community from discrimination? It should 
be an easy answer., WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/2019/04/26/does-law-protect-lgbtq-community-discrimination-it-should-be-an-easy-
answer/.  
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her employer for sex-based discrimination after she was denied a 
promotion to partnership.61 A statement considering her fitness for the 
promotion contained various comments noting her poor interpersonal 
skills and masculinity, as well as objections to her use of profanity as a 
female.62 The Supreme Court held that Hopkins’ employer had made 
an employment decision based on Hopkins’s failure to conform to 
gender stereotypes, which constituted discrimination based on sex 
under Title VII.63 Furthermore, the Court held that a Title VII pleading 
does not require that gender be the “but-for” cause of an employment 
decision.64 An employee must merely show that gender was a 
motivating factor in an employment decision to have a colorable Title 
VII claim.65 In 1991, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act 
Amendment, codifying this lesser causation standard.66 
In the 1998 case Oncale v. Sundower, the Court unanimously agreed 
that Title VII prohibits the entire spectrum of sex-based discrimination, 
including same-sex harassment.67 The plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, brought 
a Title VII claim against his employer after he quit his job due to 
workplace harassment from a person of the same sex.68 The Court held 
that Title VII’s protection against discrimination on the basis of sex 
applies to both men and women, and there was no basis to support the 
contention that Title VII categorically bars discrimination claims 
“because of sex” when the employer and employee in question are 
members of the same sex. 
Even though the Supreme Court has been forced to interpret Title 
VII on multiple occasions, it has never specifically determined whether 
the term “sex” encompasses sexual orientation. However, Justice Scalia 
did call for a common-sense approach in adjudicating Title VII cases, 
requiring that the justices take into account “social context” when 
making their decisions.69 In Sundower, Scalia wrote that “statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils.”70 
 
 61. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1989).  
 62. Id. at 234–35. 
 63. Id. at 257–58. 
 64. Id. at 240–41. 
 65. Id. at 250. 
 66. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 39. 
 67. Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
 68. Id. at 76–77. 
 69. Id. at 82. 
 70. Id. at 79. 
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IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
Bostock’s argument that the Title VII definition of “sex” ought to 
protects against discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
segmented into three primary sections.71 First, the Petitioner looks to 
the “plain language of Title VII,” arguing that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a form of sex discrimination.72 Second, he argues that 
the statutory history of Title VII and the Supreme Court’s historic 
willingness to broadly interpret the term “sex” supports including 
sexual orientation discrimination in Title VII.73 Lastly, the Petitioner 
argues that, if the Supreme Court were to interpret Title VII to not 
cover sexual orientation discrimination, it would create conflicts of 
interpretation affecting various parts of the statute.74 For purposes of 
this commentary, the following section considers only the first two 
sections of the petitioner’s argument. 
1. Statutory Interpretation: The Language of Title VII 
The first portion of the Petitioner’s argument analyzes the statutory 
language—specifically, the phrase “because of sex”—to determine its 
scope.75 The Petitioner asserts that sexual orientation is necessarily a 
sex-based classification.76 The dictionary definitions of the term 
“homosexual” require reference to use of the term “sex.”77 The 
Petitioner points to Webster’s Dictionary definition of “homosexual” 
as “of, relating to, or characterized by a tendency to direct sexual desire 
toward another of the same sex.”78 Petitioner contends the dictionary 
definitions make it clear that sexual orientation cannot be defined or 
determined without first taking an individual’s sex into account.79 
Because the Price Waterhouse holding forbids employers from relying 
on any sex-based considerations in making employment decisions, the 
Petitioner reasons that the Court should similarly forbid sexual 
 
 71. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at iii-v. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 13.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (quoting Homosexual, Webster’s New International Dictionary (3d ed. 1961)). The 
Petitioner uses the 1961 version of Webster’s Dictionary because this was the version used when 
Title VII was drafted.  
 79. Id. at 13–14.  
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orientation discrimination because it necessarily rests on a sex-based 
consideration.80 
The Petitioner then considers the Respondent’s likely 
counterargument that homosexuality does not rest on a sex-based 
consideration because sexual orientation is not “inextricably linked” to 
sex.81 Both men and women can be homosexual, so the discrimination 
is not truly class-based and thus is not actionable under Title VII.82 The 
Petitioner rebuts this, relying on Price Waterhouse. In deciding Title VII 
cases, the Supreme Court uses a classification-based, not a class-based, 
approach, which focuses on fairness to individuals rather than disparate 
treatment of classes.83 For instance, in Price Waterhouse, the Court held 
that the employer’s action based on a belief that the female plaintiff 
ought to wear jewelry was impermissibly sex-based.84 Discrimination 
based on sexual-orientation qualifies as “discrimination ‘because of 
sex,’ because an employer must consider the employee’s sex . . . [and 
then in turn] treats the employee differently than it would if she or he 
were the opposite sex.”85 
Similarly, the Petitioner asserts that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a form of associational sex discrimination, meaning 
that the discrimination is derived from the employee’s association with 
another person of the same sex.86 Associational discrimination was first 
addressed by Congress in the 1960s as it pertained to race, but has 
expanded to other contexts since then.87 Applied to the facts of this 
case, this means that discrimination against a person because of the sex 
of another person with whom they are associated is, in turn, to 
discriminate against him because of his sex.88 Of the five circuit courts 
to consider the issue, all have unanimously agreed that “the prohibition 
on associational discrimination applies with equal force to all classes 
protected by Title VII, including sex.”89 According to the Petitioner, 
these cases provide guidance for the statutory interpretation in this 
 
 80. Id. at 14. 
 81. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 15–16. 
 83. Id. at 16. The Petitioner argues the Court focuses on fairness to individuals rather than 
classes as a whole. 
 84. Id. at 17. 
 85. Id. at 17–18. 
 86. Id. at 18.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 20. 
 89. Id. at 19. (citing Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 124 (2d Cir. 2018)). 
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case.90 The cases’ logic points to the absence of a “principled reason 
why the associational theory of discrimination should not also apply to 
sex discrimination under Title VII.”91 
Price Waterhouse established that sex stereotype discrimination is 
unlawful, as it is “because of sex” discrimination under Title VII.92 The 
Petitioner argues that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex 
stereotype discrimination because sexual orientation discrimination 
arises from a failure to conform to sex-based stereotypes.93 The 
Petitioner also argues the Supreme Court’s consistent understanding of 
sex as gender, which includes an individual’s conformity (or lack 
thereof) with expected gender social roles, must necessarily protect 
LGBTQ employees from discrimination under Title VII, given 
identical existing protection for conformity (or lack thereof) with 
expected gender roles.94 As the Second Circuit reasoned in Zarda, when 
an employer acts on a belief that a female or male should not be 
attracted to another female or male, respectively, the employer has 
acted on the basis of gender.95 In Oncale, the court broadly interpreted 
“because of sex” to encompass all forms of discrimination that 
Congress might not have contemplated when it passed Title VII.96 This 
logic applies just as forcefully to sexual orientation.97 
2. The Statutory History of Title VII 
The Petitioner begins this portion of his argument by noting that, 
even in 1964, the Webster-Dictionary definition of “sex” included all 
behavior between individuals, regardless of sexual orientation.98 Thus, 
the Petitioner argues that the Civil Rights Act accordingly uses the 
term “sex” to include more protection for all individuals regardless of 
the gender of sexual partners.99 The Supreme Court has previously held 
that statutory language is flexible in interpretation and scope as new 
scenarios arise and old applications become anachronistic.100 
 
 90. Id. at 19–20. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 24. 
 93. Id. at 23–24.  
 94. Id. at 27.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 30. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 32. 
 99. Id. at 32–33. 
 100. Id. at 33 (citing West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 218 (1999)). 
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Unlike the enumerated protections for race, color, religion, and 
country of origin under Title VII, the “sex” class was a last-minute 
addition, which leaves little legislative history to guide the Court in its 
interpretation.101 However, Congress stated in 1972 that sex 
discrimination was “no less serious than other prohibited forms of 
discrimination, and that it is to be accorded the same degree of concern 
given to any type of similarly unlawful conduct.”102 In 1978, Congress 
took measures to extend the protections offered by Title VII by passing 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.103 The amendment made 
discrimination against “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions” unlawful.104 The purpose of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act was to broaden the definition of sex discrimination 
in Title VII to ensure that individuals are protected against all types of 
employment discrimination based on sex.105 
Congress passed this Act in response to the Supreme Court’s 
narrow definition of “sex” under Title VII in General Electric v. Gilbert, 
holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was permitted 
even though only women can become pregnant.106 The Act indicated 
that Congress itself intended the statutory ban on sex discrimination in 
Title VII to be interpreted broadly to prevent discrimination due to any 
sex-based classifications.107 
After 1978, Congress left the Court to interpret the “because of sex” 
clause with no further legislative clarification.108 The Supreme Court 
ruled on a number of Title VII cases, including Price Waterhouse, in 
which they broadly interpreted the “because of sex” provision.109 These 
Title VII interpretations indicated that the clause was not limited to 
forms of sex discrimination recognized at the time of its enactment—
that is, biological sex.110 In 1991, Congress confirmed and codified a 
lessened causation standard for Title VII in the Civil Rights Act.111 This 
standard provided that a violation of Title VII is shown by proof that 
sex or another protected characteristic was a motivating factor for any 
 
 101. Id. at 34. 
 102. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 7 (1971)). 
 103. Id. at 35.  
 104. Id. (citing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1978)). 
 105. Id. (citing S. REP NO. 95-331 at 2–3, H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 at 3–4). 
 106. Id. at 34. 
 107. Id. at 36. 
 108. Id. at 37. 
 109. Id. at 37–38. 
 110. Id. at 39–40. 
 111. Id. at 39. 
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employment practice (even when considered with other legitimate, 
unenumerated factors).112 The 1991 amendment passed without 
changing the “because of sex” clause, indicating congressional approval 
of the Supreme Court’s “motivating factor” doctrine.113 
In 1998, the Supreme Court unanimously decided Oncale v. 
Sundower Offshore Services, holding that the language of Title VII 
extends beyond the types of discrimination that Congress considered 
in 1964.114 Thus, Petitioner argues, Title VII encompasses sexual 
orientation discrimination because it is described by the plain statutory 
language and “there is no difficulty in interpreting the statute to reach 
more broadly than Congress may have expected in 1964.”115 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
   The Respondent’s argument is segmented into five sections. For 
purposes of this commentary, this section will only consider two of the 
five arguments.116 First, the Respondent addresses the original public 
understanding of “sex” as used in Title VII.117 Second, the Respondent 
addresses the legislative developments that confirm that Title VII does 
not include sexual orientation as a protected class.118 
1. The 1964 Definition of “Sex” 
The Respondent’s argument begins by addressing the original 
meaning of “sex” as it was commonly understood when Title VII was 
written in 1964, arguing that it prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sex, but not sexual orientation.119 The Respondent notes that the Court 
has repeatedly interpreted statutes applying their original public 
meaning, stating that “words generally should be ‘interpreted as taking 
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”120 The Respondent 
argues that “contemporary” refers to the time in which the statute was 
enacted, which is 1964 for the Civil Rights Act. This allows the public 
to understand the legislation as Congress, not the courts, intended. The 
Respondent states that the Petitioner’s argument that statutory 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 44 (citing Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)). 
 115. Id. at 45. 
 116. Brief for Respondent, supra note 23, at i-iv. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 10.  
 120. Id. at 10 (quoting Wisc. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018)).  
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language ought to be flexible only applies in scenarios when there has 
been later statutory authorization to alter the interpretation of a 
statute’s language.121 
The Respondent continues by explaining that the 1964 ordinary 
meaning of the term “sex” was biological sex, thus not covering sexual 
orientation or homosexuality.122 As noted in the Petitioner’s brief, the 
term “sex” was a last minute addition to Title VII, so there is little 
legislative history to guide the Court’s interpretation of this term.123 In 
the absence of such guidance, the Respondent reasons, returning to the 
ordinary meaning of the term is appropriate.124 To do this, the 
Respondent turns to the 1964 dictionary definition of the term and 
compares it to the modern definition.125 The phrase “sexual 
orientation” does not appear in either definition.126 The Respondent 
states that the Petitioner’s attempt to include “behavior” as part of the 
definition of the term is inappropriate, as the other enumerated 
categories of Title VII protect certain characteristics, not behaviors.127 
Thus, the Respondent argues, Title VII only prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of biological sex, not on the basis of sexual 
orientation.128 
2. Legislative Developments Regarding Title VII 
The Respondent notes that Congress has repeatedly chosen not to 
adopt proposed legislation that would have added sexual orientation 
as a protected class under Title VII.129 Since 1974, there have been fifty 
proposed bills in this category, including the Equality Act of 2019, 
which has not yet passed the Senate.130 The Respondent refers to the 
Petitioner’s argument that Congress has not amended Title VII to 
include sexual orientation because it already includes sexual 
orientation as a protected class as “preposterous,”131 because circuit 
courts and the EEOC have held otherwise for decades.132 According to 
 
 121. Id. at 12.  
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 123. Id. at 13. 
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 128. Id. at 15–16.  
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the Respondent, the number of bills introduced over the past forty-five 
years seeking to amend Title VII to add sexual orientation as a 
protected class demonstrate that Congress is aware that this class has 
been left unprotected by Title VII.133 
The Respondent further argues that by enacting the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Congress incorporated the decisions of the EEOC and 
circuit courts holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation.134 The Respondent states that Congress 
incorporated the EEOC’s longstanding interpretation that Title VII 
does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination by including the 
same language as Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.135 The 
Supreme Court has stated that if “a word or phrase has been . . . given 
a uniform interpretation by inferior courts . . . a later version of that act 
perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry forward in that 
interpretation.”136 In 1991, every federal court of appeals to consider 
the issue had held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.137 Thus, the Respondent reasons, the Court 
ought to find that Congress carried forward prior judicial 
interpretation of the term “sex” within Title VII when it used identical 
language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.138 
The Respondent points out that Congress has included sexual 
orientation as a protected class in addition to sex or gender in various 
civil rights statutes and other statutes enacted between 1998 and 2013, 
such as the Violence Against Women Act. These recent statutes in 
which Congress has specifically enumerated “sexual orientation” as a 
protected class indicate Congress’s awareness and acknowledgment of 
the distinction between “sex” and “sexual orientation.”139 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Historic Textualist v. Purposivist Approaches 
Statutory interpretation has long been divided into two broad 
 
 133. Id. at 49–50. 
 134. Id. at 51.  
 135. Id. at 52. 
 136. Id. at 52 (citing Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 628, 633-34 (2019)).  
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categories: textualism and purposivism.140 Purposivists appreciate the 
“spirit rather than the letter of the law,” and approve of judicial 
interpretation with the objective purpose of the legislature in mind.141 
In contrast, textualists emphasize that judges should not give effect to 
the un-enacted evidence of legislative purpose.142 Here, the only 
language for the Court to interpret is the term “sex.” If you had asked 
the Civil Rights Act drafters specifically whether they intended for the 
term “sex” to encompass gender and sexual orientation discrimination, 
they would likely be unaware why such a question was being posed.143 
White women pushed for the term “sex” to even be included for their 
own protection in the workplace.144 In 1964, LGBTQ rights and anti-
discrimination measures were not contemplated by legislators. From a 
textualist approach, this would mean that “sex” strictly means 
biological sex. However, society has progressed to a point that the term 
requires a much broader interpretation. 
With no protection in place against sexual orientation 
discrimination in the workplace in numerous states, the Supreme Court 
should interpret “sex” to encompass sexual orientation. This would 
require somewhat of a purposivist approach, but not one that requires 
an unprecedented level of implied interpretation. The underlying 
purpose of Title VII is to ban employer discrimination based on 
anything other than work performance. In this particular case, Bostock 
was an outstanding employee and his sexual orientation contributed to 
his termination.145 He and other members of the LGBTQ community 
deserve protection from unjust discrimination. 
The Supreme Court already crossed the line into purposivist 
interpretation in both Oncale and Price Waterhouse.146 In Price 
Waterhouse, Title VII was found to protect against discrimination based 
on a failure to conform to gender stereotypes.147 And, in Oncale, Title 
VII was found to protect against the “entire spectrum” of sex-based 
 
 140. See John Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 
70–111 (2006) (describing the differences between textualists and purposivists).  
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 143.  Garrett Epps, Why ‘Because of Sex’ Should Protect Gay People, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 
29, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/title-vii-should-protect-gay-people/ 
598825/. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 4–6. 
 146. Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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discrimination.148 The Supreme Court has already given Title VII 
meaning beyond the explicit language. This interpretation of “sex” to 
include sexual orientation would align with the original purpose of Title 
VII and give LGBTQ employees protection. As Justice Scalia wrote in 
Oncale, and as the Petitioner points out, the Court must interpret Title 
VII to prohibit some forms of sex discrimination that simply were not 
considered in 1964. 
Although the Respondent argues that the interpretations from 
Price Waterhouse and Oncale still align with the 1964 definition of 
“sex,” both parties seem to agree that cases of homosexuality and sex 
stereotyping were likely not even considered in 1964, because the 
protection against “sex” discrimination was a last-minute addition. 
Interpreting “because of sex” to extend to sexual orientation does not 
require an abrogation of its original definition; it merely requires an 
extension of the definition to cover traits that are necessarily affiliated 
with sex, such as sexual orientation. This strongly parallels the Supreme 
Court’s logic in Price Waterhouse by construing “because of sex” to 
cover sex stereotypes. 
B. Policy Implications 
The House of Representatives has recently found that, in the 
absence of explicit laws against sexual orientation discrimination, there 
is some level of uncertainty for employers.149 In response, the House 
passed the Equality Act of 2019 to expand the definition of Title VII to 
include sexual orientation within the meaning of sex.150 However, this 
was too late for the number of LGBTQ employees who have already 
experienced discrimination in the workplace due to their sexual 
orientation. There is not a failure on Congress’ part to recognize that 
LGBTQ employees deserve equal rights; as the Respondent notes, 
there have been numerous proposed amendments to amend this 
section of Title VII. However, there has been a failure by Congress to 
act in time to provide appropriate legislative protection for these 
individuals. 
In an ideal world, Congress would have amended Title VII some 
time ago instead of forcing the Supreme Court to interpret an older 
piece of legislation that does not always appropriately apply to modern 
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social constructs. There are some circuit judges (and Supreme Court 
justices) that feel some amount of discomfort in extending the 
definition to include sexual orientation.151 However, to do nothing 
would leave LGBTQ employees unprotected from discrimination for 
an indefinite amount of time until Congress successfully passes a Title 
VII amendment. Protection against discrimination seems to heavily 
outweigh concerns regarding reinterpretation of Title VII, especially 
since this current interpretation resulted from Congress’s inability to 
address the issue at hand sooner. 
The past two times that Congress successfully amended Title VII 
both occurred after Title VII was interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
Congress’s Pregnancy Discrimination Act reversed what Congress 
believed to be an erroneous Supreme Court decision that allowed 
discrimination against pregnant women, and the 1991 Civil Rights 
Amendment codified a new causation standard that had already been 
set forth by the Supreme Court.152 If the Supreme Court were to 
interpret “because of sex,” in new way contrary to Congressional 
intent, Congress still has the legislative power to reverse this decision 
or codify the interpretation thereafter with another Civil Rights Act 
amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the Supreme Court to rule in favor of Bostock, it would have to 
broadly interpret the “because of sex” clause in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act. Regardless of the outcome, this would resolve a current 
circuit court split on whether the prohibition of discrimination based 
on “sex” extends to discrimination based on an employee’s sexual 
orientation. Further, if the Court rules for Bostock, it will provide 
necessary protection for LGBTQ workers. There is valid concern that 
this would be an overextension of the Supreme Court’s judicial power; 
however, a clearer definition of the term “sex” would appropriately 
protect against sexual orientation discrimination similar to the 
interpretation of sexual stereotyping in Price Waterhouse. 
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